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It would be well to be quite sure
Just who are the deserving poor
Or else the state-supported ditch
May serve the Undeserving Rich.
Kenneth Boulding (1966)
1. Introduction
During the late seventies and early eighties, economists devoted considerable attention to the
distributional effects of projects.  This attention reflected long-standing concerns of applied welfare
economists about the distributive implications of prescriptive judgements (Little, 1950).  Closer to
practice, there were attempts to bringing into the open, using cost-benefit methods, and in a form
suitable for practical application in a planning context, the interpersonal and intertemporal value
judgements inherent to investment decisions (Marglin, 1967).  These efforts, coupled with the
perception by international observers that development institutions were not reaching the poor as
much as desired, led to the publication of two influential books proposing specific methodologies
to bring into the open these value judgements (Little and Mirrlees, 1969, 1974; UNIDO, 1972).  
The theoretical and methodological discussion about estimating interpersonal distributional
effects stayed (and stays) well ahead of implementation.  Initially, applied economists faced with the
requirement of producing an estimate of distributional effects had very little guidance available,
2 and
what was available reflected the limited experience acquired up to that moment.  During the eighties,Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 3 3
     
3 On the external benefits of estimating distributional effects, see Londero (1996).
only one development institution, the Inter-American Development Bank, regularly estimated the
distributional effects of the projects it helped to finance.  A book presenting principles and
applications was published as a result of that experience (Londero, 1987).
Nowadays, applied economists seem to be more aware of the normative importance of
estimating distributional effects, and, perhaps, of its practical virtues.
3  This greater awareness has
not necessarily resulted in more and better estimates of distributive effects, nor in the full use of the
ensuing expertise for policy advice and policy design.  In recent years there has been a reduced
interest by multilateral development institutions in the distributional effects of policy measures, as
well as less emphasis on cost-benefit analysis and more emphasis on non-project lending.
In the nineties, the use of cost-benefit methods has been greatly reduced and the estimation
of distributional effects has been practically abandoned.  Most investment is expected to result from
the profit motive, and the role of the public sector is presumed to be that of creating the conditions
for such investment to lead to an economically efficient outcome, as if such desirability could be
established independently of interpersonal and intertemporal value judgements.  Raising public
revenue and expenditure decisions would also be guided by efficiency considerations, but attention
would be concentrated in areas were the public-good nature of the output and the existence of
externalities would result in too little private investment.  Also, the role of the government is
presumed to be that of protecting the poor from the market outcome, while trying to improve those
labor force characteristics that the market requires.
Concerns about the ability of reaching the poor have led to promoting the design of poverty
targeted interventions, in some cases leading to the dichotomous classification of projects into
poverty targeted and the rest.  To that effect, two not mutually exclusive definitions of poverty
targeted projects seem to be in use.  One is that of building into project design specific instruments
to channel to the poor more benefits than would otherwise have been the case.  The other requires
that headcount measures of poor beneficiaries exceed a certain threshold.  In both cases, it is
implicitly assumed that it is sufficient to comply with these criteria, and that it is not necessary to4 Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 4
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estimate the distribution of project costs and benefits.  This paper will examine these two
classification criteria, show that compliance with them does not ensure equity in the final distribution
of benefits, and argue in favor of the importance of distributionally minded economic analysis for
project and policy design even when projects are "poverty targeted".
4
The paper will also discuss the appropriation of benefits in the form of rents.  There will be
nothing new in this discussion.  In fact, the issues have been discussed by politicians and tax
authorities well before welfare economists existed, and are well known to tax specialists and
administrators.  But tax specialists and administrators rarely appraise projects, and project
economists often ignore these issues.  This discussion will set the tone for presenting the case of
seemingly poverty targeted projects that generate an important share of total benefits in the form of
rents that accrue to the non-poor.  The role of property taxes in the project’s distributional outcome
will be briefly discussed.
Finally, the paper will argue for the importance of looking at the distribution of net benefits.
Some alternatives to that effect will be discussed briefly.
2. Poverty Targeted Projects and Distributional Effects
The first common definition of a poverty targeted project is a project whose design includes specific
instruments to channel to the poor more benefits than would otherwise have been the case.  An
important characteristic of this definition is that it is not concerned with the amount of benefits
channeled to the poor, but only with the existence of the targeting instruments.  The project may be
selected according to unspecified criteria.  Then, its distributional impact is "improved" through
targeting.  Therefore, there is no way of knowing what the effect of this approach would be on the
poor without knowing the criteria for selecting the project and the impact of the distributive
improvement.  This definition of poverty targeting does not establish a minimum share of project
benefits that should be appropriated by the poor, or a minimum additional percentage of project
benefits that should be channeled in excess of those in the situation “without the targeting” for aPoverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 5 5
project to be considered targeted.  Therefore, a project that provides services for the rich but includes
a special arrangement to provide some services to the poor qualifies as poverty targeted, despite the
fact that the majority of benefits is received by the rich.  In fact, unless some thresholds complement
the criterion, any instrument obtaining any additional amount of benefits to the poor would make a
project poverty targeted under this definition.
The second definition is one of headcount impact.  For a project to be poverty targeted it is
normally asked that the percentage of poor beneficiaries exceeds a certain preestablished threshold,
for example, the headcount poverty incidence in the country or region.  Therefore, it would be
possible for a project to qualify as poverty targeted because the number of poor beneficiaries as a
proportion of non-poor ones exceeds the threshold, while the percentage of total benefits received
by the poor is actually low.
In these methods, it is normally unclear how the word "beneficiaries" is defined.  It has to be
assumed that beneficiaries does not mean just those whose welfare improves, but rather those
affected, that is, those receiving positive or negative welfare changes.  Otherwise, those who lose
as a result of the project would be ignored.  But if losers are included, there is no indication as to
how to treat them.  Should the number of losers be deducted from the number of gainers according
to poverty level?  This vagueness in defining what is meant by beneficiaries manifests itself when
looking at the cost side of the project, since it is also obscure how to treat beneficiaries such as
workers receiving wages that exceed their compensating variation for accepting the job.
It would be perfectly possible for a project to be poverty targeted according to any of the
above definitions and to have fewer beneficiaries, or deliver less benefits to the poor, than the
alternative course of action.  In other words, it would be possible for the project to have negative net
poor beneficiaries, or for the poor to receive negative net benefits.  If the aim is to increase the
welfare of the poor, the analyst should look at the distributional effects of public investments in net
terms, that is, the difference between what would be obtained with the project less what would have
been obtained with the alternative course of action (Londero, 1987).  While this is more easily said
than done, the use of headcount measures combined with ignoring the distributional effects of the
alternative course of action may result in increasing poverty when compared with the alternative6 Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 6
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subject of market transactions see, inter alia, the exchange of views in The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 4 and the references therein.
course of action.
Three conclusions are warranted.  First, it is unclear what is the meaning of poverty targeted
when the preceding definitions are used as instruments to select projects that are expected to
contribute to poverty reduction.  Second, headcount-based measures of poverty targeting say very
little about the distributional effects of public actions.  Third,  measures of distributional effects
should take into account the distributional effect of the alternative course of action; this issue will
considered in section 5 below.
3. Projects, Rents, and Distributional Effects
Conventional applied welfare economics has emphasized the measurement of costs and benefits
when outputs are subject to market transactions.
5  In most of these cases, market competition
eventually leads to the elimination of temporary rents (or quasi rents) and benefits are finally enjoyed
by the population at large according to expenditure levels and patterns.  But such is not the case in
all projects.  There are many cases in which the appropriation of benefits is determined by the
ownership of a non-reproducible asset, such as land.  In those cases, competition would not transfer
the additional benefits to the population at large through prices.  Rather, these benefits would be
finally enjoyed by property owners in the form of additional rents.  Such is the case, for example,
of an irrigation project that increases the productivity of intramarginal farms.  The unit production
costs of these farms would be reduced by the project, while market prices would remain unaffected,
since they are determined by the marginal producers, who would not be affected by the project
(Londero, 1987, Chapter 7).
When benefits of irrigation projects are appropriated by the intramarginal producers as rents,
the method traditionally used to estimate benefits, that is the incremental farm budgets, measures
benefits at the point where they will be appropriated.  As a result, there is a direct connection
between measuring benefits and estimating their distribution.  Instead, if the farms in question arePoverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 7 7
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8 Note that of course some of this landowners may also use the road, but it is their land
ownership, rather than their vehicle ownership, what determines the appropriation.
at the margin, farm-gate prices will decline and benefits are likely to be transferred forward through
prices, and eventually reach the consumer.  In such a case, the marginal farmers should not be
considered the beneficiaries, since they do not appropriate the benefits.  Moreover, intramarginal
farmers lose as a result of the project due to the price reductions.  If benefits are passed on to the
consumers through prices, the distribution of benefits according to income levels will depend on the
specific agricultural products, and primarily on expenditure shares on these products, rather than on
the distribution of farms according to productivity and size.
In other cases, the point at which benefits are measured differs from the point at which
benefits are appropriated, and both differ from the point at which final transactions take place.  That,
for example, would be the case of freely accessible urban roads.
6  Efficiency benefits of road projects
are normally measured by estimating time and vehicle operating cost savings,
7 but most of these
savings are not appropriated by vehicle owners.  In the case of a major route, passing cargo vehicles
originate normally in a variety of locations.  Thus, it is likely that benefits would be appropriated
similarly to the irrigation of marginal farms, and would mostly be reflected in final price reductions.
In the case of an urban road, local traffic will enjoy cost and time savings according to the origin and
destination of the trip, making location the dominant characteristic for benefit appropriation.
Therefore, it is landowners, rather than transporters, producers or consumers, who receive a
significant part of the benefits through the prices commanded by their properties.
8
There is ample evidence about the capturing of benefits by land owners.  In studying the
effects of transportation improvements on land values, McDonald and Osuji (1995) found that not
only adjacent land values increased substantially due to the specific improvement, but also that land
markets anticipated the benefits derived from its construction.  Also, Haughwout (1997) found that
benefits of infrastructure investments in central cities are partially captured by suburban land owners.8 Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 8
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 Voith (1993) shows that suburban land values increase over time as cities continue to grow.  Finally,
Haughwout (1997) found that property taxes were (more than) fully capitalized in property values.
These distributional effects may not be the result of error or insufficient information.
Publicly financed roads are often built to develop urban land previously acquired by rent seeking
entrepreneurs speculating on land values, who in turn finance political campaigns, particularly at the
local level.  It may be argued that such political relations reduce the incentives for politicians to
pursue poverty focused distributional goals.
The economist knows that increased property values in the area of influence of the road
should not be added to time and cost savings benefits because it would amount to double counting
(Mohring, 1961; Harberger, 1972).  Increased property values reflect the already computed time and
cost savings.  The economist is also aware that transportation projects generate distributional effects
of the type described,
9 but is often instructed not to worry about the distribution of those benefits,
since distributional considerations are ignored in efficiency analysis and would be addressed by fiscal
policy.  Whether fiscal policy addresses these distributional concerns does not seem to be the
business of the project economist.
Urban roads is not the only case where these issues arise.  A similar case is that of freely
provided public education when quality varies significantly among schools.  Here also the demand
for the characteristic is associated to location, and at least part of the benefit may be appropriated as
a locational rent.  Therefore, in the absence of taxes capturing these rents, not all benefits of such
education would be appropriated by students.
10
Some poverty targeted projects generate benefits appropriated by the non-poor that may be
comparable in amount to the benefits captured by those targeted.  Urban development projects are
one of these cases.  Consider the case of slum relocations, which would be classified as targeted toPoverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 9 9
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the poor under both definitions discussed.  First, because only slum dwellers would receive new
housing that would not have been received otherwise.  Second, because headcounts are likely to
show that a high share of these dwellers are poor.  However, these projects may also have external
effects captured through land ownership, and thus have significant distributional effects for the non-
poor.
Historically, when the poor acquired the possession of urban land, they selected the best
available: close to employment opportunities and transportation.  What could have been marginal
land at the time, has become in many cities prime real estate today.  The relocation of those slums
not only would allow landowners many times the government to extract the rents assigned to them
by law, but also to generate significant increases in the market value of the surrounding properties.
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In many cases, the rents generated by the relocation to owners of the land where the slums are
located and to surrounding landowners may be comparable in magnitude to the benefits of the
additional housing provided to the relocated dwellers.  The economic analysis of these projects,
however, frequently ignores these benefits to landowners, and does not discuss the existence and
effectiveness of instruments to publicly capture those rents.
To a large extent, cost-benefit practice has not aimed at capturing the distribution of benefits
when land property is an important determinant of the ensuing distribution.  The fact that the current
state of the art does not provide with reliable ways for estimating such effects may be one of the
reasons behind this omission.  However, even under the rules of efficiency analysis, and even when
no cost-benefit analysis is conducted, distributional concerns would require project economists to
assess the government’s ability and willingness to capture rents, as well as to explore policy options
to that effect.  In most instances, such assessment would require for the project economist to get
involved in the inner workings of the tax system.  In the absence of effective instruments for the
government to capture these rents, the efficiency analysis of such investments becomes a silent
accomplice to the private appropriation by landowners of a significant share of public investment
benefits.10 Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 10
It is possible to obtain a simple rule of thumb for checking whether the existing property tax,
if enforced, is capable of capturing the rents generated by the project.  Say that the increase in the
value of property i is  Vi, that fiscal valuations are a proportion   of market values, and that the tax
rate is t.  Then, the present value of the yearly tax collections from property i, Tit, over an infinite
horizon would be
PV(Tit) =  Vi   t / d [1]
where d is the discount rate.  The tax rate that enforced would yield a present value equal to the
increase in the value of the property [PV(Tit) =  Vi] would be t = d /  .  In numbers, if the official
valuation is 80 percent of the market value and the discount rate is 3 percent, the tax rate should be
not smaller than 3.75 percent.  Expression [1] assumes full compliance.  Enforcement differs from
valuation in that it is an owner-by-owner issue, and it is thus not amenable to be incorporated as an
average compliance rate in a general formula to be applied to specific cases, like the one presented.
If there were less that full compliance, the government would be faced with the decision of
increasing compliance, increasing the tax rate, or foregoing part of the revenue (that is, granting part
of the rents).  What is important to note is that the amount of benefits yearly redistributed to the
government by the property tax would depend on property valuations, tax rates, and evasion rates.
The project economist may present the issues and explore the consequences of alternative courses
of action.
When rents are a significant part of project benefits, a distributionally-minded project
analysis should point out the nature of these rents, discuss their approximate quantitative importance,
identify the beneficiaries, and analyze whether there are means in place for capturing those rents, and
whether the existing ones are enforced and sufficient to effect the redistribution.  Finally, alternative
policy interventions and their expected effects should also be discussed.
4. A Simple Example
Consider an example in which the government relocates a slum located in a plot of its own property,Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 11 11
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paying the construction costs, and purchasing the necessary land at market price.  For simplicity, it
is assumed that these costs are the only ones involved, that market prices equal efficiency prices, and
that there are no transfers to record from the efficiency pricing.  Houses are provided at a price below
demand price.  The government receives the corresponding amount, and regains possession of the
land valued at its market price.  The resulting net changes for the government are summarized in
Table 1.
12
Table 1.  Distributional effects of slum relocation (hypothetical example)
(in thousands of US$)





Net willingness to pay
(new houses less old)
  15000   15000
Paid (new houses) 7500     7500
Construction costs 12750 12750
Land purchases  2250  2250
Willingness to receive 2250  2250
Increase in land values  3700    3700
Recuperated land    6000    6000
Market value of
surrounding land
 11000   11000
Total  7500  1500  11000  3700   20700
Source: According to explanation in the text.  Also see Appendix B.
The slum dwellers gain their net willingness to pay for the new houses, that is, their valuation
of the new housing in excess of their valuation of the old ones in the relocated slum.  The owners
of the land surrounding the slum gain the additional value of their properties, an external effect of
relocating the slum.  Finally, the owners of the land where the new houses are located gain the12 Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 12
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possible changes in land values are presented in Appendix A.
     
14 For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the rate of discount equals the marginal return
of investment, and therefore the analysis need not be concerned with different valuations of
consumption and investment (UNIDO, 1972).
     
15 Note that a 33 percent increase in the value of the land amounts to a smaller percent increase
in the value of the property.  If land is 20-30 percent of the value of the property, that 33 percent
would amount to an 6.7-10 percent increase in total property value.
increase in property values resulting from the urbanization.
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Equal welfare weights for all affected allow the columns to be added horizontally to obtain
the Total column, which indicates the net benefits at efficiency prices of the project.
14  These net
 benefits are the willingness to pay for the additional housing provided, less the costs to provide it
(land, plus construction costs), plus the value of the land where the slums were located, plus the
change in land values in the areas surrounding the old slum and surrounding the new development.
It is conceivable that the benefits accruing to landowners (including the government) would
be of comparable magnitude to the benefits accruing to the slum dwellers, particularly because the
surrounding land often has more area than the land occupied by the slum.  Given the incidence of
benefits, the project could be considered a housing project for the poor, as well as a land
“improvement” project for the non-poor.  Relocation costs, land values and increases in these values
assumed in the example are within the limits of experience.  The project is assumed to pass the cost-
benefit test when willingness to pay for the incremental housing services is the only benefit
computed, as is frequently the case.  The government is assumed to recover fifty percent of the cost
of providing the new housing.  Increases in land values of the surrounding areas (both the original
slum and the new development) are estimated as 33 percent for the first 100 m  radius ring, 18
percent for the following 100 m ring, and 11 percent for the third 100 m ring.
15  The value of the land
occupied by the slum is assumed to be five times the value of the land where the slum-dwellers are
relocated, and no price increase of the land acquired by the government is computed.  The effects
on public utilities, urban transportation services and other parts of projects like this have beenPoverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 13 13
omitted for the sake of simplicity.
The results show what urban developers have always known: that many so-called urban
development projects, when looked at from the point of view of the appropriation of benefits, are
primarily large real estate operations.  It may be concluded, therefore, that designating projects like
the one described as primarily benefitting the poor should be preceded by a careful estimation of
their distributional impact.  Further research, particularly ex-post evaluations of benefit appropriation
through land ownership (e.g., Boyce et al., 1976; Haughwout, 1997; McDonald and Osuji, 1995),
would be useful for the understanding of the distributional effects involved in this type of projects.
An important determinant of that distributional outcome would be the existence and
enforcement of tax instruments for the government to capture the additional rents generated by the
public project.  That would be, for example, the case of a property tax, assumed away thus far in the
preceding example.  Such a tax would reduce the benefits to landowners by the present value of the
additional tax revenue, increasing the benefits received by the government by an equivalent amount
(net of any incremental collection or efficiency cost; see inter alia, Sandmo, 1998).
5. The Distribution of Net Benefits
The results presented in Table 1 show who bears most of the costs and who receives most of the
benefits of the slum relocation project in the absence of government instruments to capture the
increases in property values.  These tables do not indicate, however, the net effect on these groups
of persons, that is, the results of what they obtain from the project less what they would have
obtained with the alternative course of action.  Identifying such alternative course of action is the
first step towards estimating their net benefits.  
The slum relocation project is a government decision about the financing and allocation of
expenditures.  Therefore, it is the alternative use of such funds what would constitute the “situation
without the project”.  Three pure alternatives come to mind: not increasing taxes to finance the
project, returning taxes that have already been collected, and reducing other expenditures.  In
practice, taxes are seldom returned, and the level of revenue is rarely determined by the desired level
of investment at the project level.  More frequently, alternatives at the project level are whether to14 Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 14
finance one project or another, or, sometimes, they are about the sequencing of investments that
would be made one way or the other.
  If the alternative course of action were another project, the net benefits to those affected
would be the costs and benefits recorded in Table 1, less the cost and benefits that would have been
obtained with the alternative project.  Say that the displaced project is for the provision of services
to the poor with the distribution of costs and benefits presented in Table 2.  In such case, the net
benefits to poor beneficiaries of relocating the slum would be negative, since what they obtain with
the project is less than what they would have obtained with the displaced project.  The benefits to
the non-poor, instead, constitute the foundation of the net efficiency benefits of the slum relocation.
Table 2.  Net distributional effects of the slum relocation






Slum relocation project  7500  15000 13500  14700   20700
Alternative investment 11000 (15000) 13500   9500
Net benefits  3500  14700  11200
Source: Table 1.
 What initially appeared to be a poverty targeted project, and later on a housing/land improvement
project, turned out to be, after estimating the distribution of costs and benefits, one which, in the 
absence of government instruments to tax rents, provides significant net benefits to the non-poor,
and negative net benefits to the poor.  The reader may verify that the distribution of the net benefits
changes dramatically if a property tax captures the benefits capitalized in land values.
Net benefit estimates are highly sensitive to the distributive effects of the alternative course
of action, which is not normally known with a high degree of certainty.  Additionally, the stock of
alternatives is not independent of government revealed distributive preferences.  Project formulators
respond to incentives and reflect these government preferences in their identification of potential
projects.Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 15 15
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There is little experience in trying to identify the distributional effects of alternative
courses of action.  At the level of the displaced projects, experience indicates that projects are
incorporated to the budget taking into account the relative power of the respective constituencies.
The poor frequently do not have the political power to press the government to pursue their interests
at the project level.  As a result, the percentage of benefits to the poor of marginally displaced
projects tends to be relatively high.
Difficulties to establish the counterfactual should not prevent economists from attempting
to provide tentative figures regarding net benefits.  The average incidence of taxes, for example,
would constitute a starting point.  If any effort to improve the welfare of the poor is being made, it
would be expected that, on the average, projects would have at a minimum a positive net benefit to
the poor when compared with tax incidence.  It should be noted that such effect may be obtained
with the combination of a low percentage of benefits to the poor and a high amount of total benefits.
While improving the situation of the poor relative to a situation without taxes and the associated
projects, this approach may lead to a more unequal distribution of welfare.  
A second, more demanding criterion may require that the share of benefits to the poor
resulting from all projects in one year exceeds the poor's share in average tax incidence.  This
criterion includes the preceding one as long as the net benefits of the project are positive, and
contributes to greater equity in the distribution of total welfare.
16  This seems to have been implicitly
in the mind of the so-called “Washington consensus”,
17 since the recommendations on public
expenditure referred to "the potential to improve income distribution" (Williamson, 1997, p. 61).
The shortcomings of the preceding approaches are well known.  In practice, the
counterfactual to a project decision is often another project decision, since marginal rates of return
rarely are close to notionally accepted rates of discount, and since accounting prices of investment
are not used.  In such situations, neither criterion provides any guidance as to what would be the16 Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 16
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minimum amount of net benefits that should be sacrificed in order to obtain one additional unit of
benefit for the poor.
18  The second criterion does not state how much higher the poor’s share ought
to be, neither does it provide any guidance as to tax incidence.  Rather, it seems to take tax incidence
as a datum and tries to improve from there, thus sanctifying the distributional value judgements
implicit in the tax code cum enforcement.
A more theoretical, and certainly more consistent point of view, argues that tax and
expenditure decisions are policy decisions by the government, and therefore should be the result of
applying the same welfare function.  Therefore, the size of the government, the tax instruments to
finance it, and the shadow prices reflecting government preferences should be the outcome of the
same maximizing exercise (Sandmo, 1998).  While this approach is clearly better conceptually, it
is less clear how it could be implemented.
In any of these cases, the responsibility for estimating the distributional effect of the
alternative course of action is outside the scope of work of the project economist.  It would be the
responsibility of the project authority to request it, and probably that of the fiscal or planning
authority to provide it.
Regardless of the position with respect to these and other proposals, it is clear that a proactive
stance in channeling benefits to the poor requires more than estimating the distributional effects of
the project.  It requires to focus the attention on the distribution of net benefits.  This approach would
bring the project economist closer to the discussion of the distributional implications of tax and
expenditure policies.
6. Conclusions
Headcount definitions of poverty impact are not clear as to who should be considered "beneficiaries".
Therefore, the application of these definitions may result in inconsistent operational criteria, and may
provide incorrect headcount figures of those affected by the project.
Headcount definitions of poverty impact are misleading when compared to measures basedPoverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 17 17
on estimating costs and benefits according to standard applied welfare economics methods.
Therefore, headcount-based classifications of projects as poverty targeted should not be expected
to convey any information on the distributional effect of the “targeted” project.  In fact, a project may
be poverty targeted according to any of the definitions presented in this paper and have regressive
welfare effects as measured conventionally.
When the estimation of benefits is possible, estimating the distribution of project costs and
benefits would provide a much more accurate description of distributional effects than head
counting.  A complete description requires estimation of the net impact.  Measuring net effects
requires knowledge of the distributional effects of alternative courses of action, leading into the
analysis of tax and expenditure decisions from an applied welfare economics perspective.
The methods used to quantify total efficiency benefits may differ from the ways benefits are
finally appropriated.  As a result, an estimate of distributional effects based on methods designed to
capture efficiency benefits may lead to error.
Projects often provide benefits that are captured through land ownership and reflected in the
value of land.  The distributional effects of many projects, but particularly of those generating rents,
are determined by tax policy towards the value of non-reproducible assets.  Whenever a significant
share of the benefits of a project are appropriated by asset owners in the form of higher asset prices,
the distributionally-minded analyst should point that out and discuss the effects of current and
alternative tax policies.
Ex-post evaluation studies of projects affecting assets values, using cost-benefit methods and
focused on these effects on the value of assets, would contribute to the understanding of the
distributional effects of these projects.  Such understanding will be useful in the design of projects
and policies aimed at reducing poverty and improving distribution.
* * *18 Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 18
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values.  For other effects on land values see below.
     
21 For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the rate of discount equals the marginal return
of investment, and therefore the analysis need not be concerned with different valuations of
consumption and investment (UNIDO, 1972).
Appendix A.  Distributional Effects of Relocating the Slum
Consider the example depicted in Figure 1.  The government relocates a slum located in plot GL0
of its own property Figure 1(a), paying the construction costs CC, and purchasing land
HL = HL0  HL1 at market price p
H
1
L Figure 1(b).  For simplicity, it is assumed that these costs are
the only ones involved, that market prices equal efficiency prices, and that there are no transfers from
the efficiency pricing to record.  Houses are provided at price p
g
0, below demand price p
d
0 Figure
1(c).  The government receives the corresponding amount, and regains possession of the land GL0
valued at its market price p
G
0
L.  The resulting net changes for the government are summarized in
Table 3.
19
The slum dwellers gain their net willingness to pay for the new houses, that is, their valuation
of the new housing in excess of their valuation of the old ones in the relocated slum.  The owners
of the land surrounding the slum (SL) gain the additional value of their properties Figure 1(d),
an external effect of relocating the slum.  Finally, the owners of the land where the new houses are
located gain the increase in property values resulting from the urbanization.
20
Equal welfare weights for all affected allow the columns to be added horizontally to obtain
the Total column, which indicates the net benefits at efficiency prices of the project.
21   These net
benefits are the willingness to pay for the additional housing provided, less the costs to provide it
(land, plus construction costs), plus the value of the land where the slums were located, plus the
change in land values in the areas surrounding the old slum and surrounding the new development.Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 19 19
Figure 1.  Main effects of a slum relocation project
There may be some other important effects resulting from the additional amount of land at
the disposition of the government, and from the increase in the quality of the land surrounding the
slum.  Say that there are three types of land (A, B, and C), with markets as depicted in Figure 2.










a result, there would be an additional supply of land A composed by the sum of these two quantities,
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Figure 2.  Additional effects of the slum relocation project
Lands of different types are likely to be close substitutes with those of similar quality.
Therefore, the reduction in the price of land A may reduce the demand for land B, and the increase
in the price of land C where the slum is relocated may increase the demand for land B (marked with
broken lines in Figure 2, Land type B).  These effects would lead to further distributional effects.
It may be argued that these changes in the supply of land A and B are very small in
comparison to total supply, and therefore the associated  price changes are also very small.  Such
may be the case, but small price changes would be multiplied by large quantities resulting in income22 Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 22
     
22 See Wildasin (1988).
Figure 3.The slum and surrounding areas
changes of comparable size with those registered in Table 1.
22
The equivalence between the notation of Table 1 is the following: the additional land for the














2   p
B












Appendix B.  The Numerical Example of Table 1
The slum is assumed to hold 1,000 families occupying a circular area of 40,000 m
2, represented by
the circle at the center of Figure 3.  The corresponding radius is thus 113 m.  The surface of the first
100 m surrounding ring would be the surface of a
213 circle less the  40,000 m
2 of the slum.  That is,
 × 213
2  40,000 = 102,531 m
2.  The surface of the
second ring is    × 313
2  142,531 = 165,248 m
2.
Finally, the surface of the third ring is 228,080 m
2.
The land where the slum is located is assumed to
cost $150/m
2 without the slum, that is a total of
$6,000,000.  As a result of the slum, the surrounding
areas lose 25% of its value for the first 100  m, 15%
for the following 100 m and 10% for the third and
last 100 m.  Therefore, the unit values of the land
with and without the slum are:
With the slum Without the slum Appreciation
First ring 112.5 150 37.5
Second ring 127.5 150 22.5
Third ring 135.0 150 15.0Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 23 23
The resulting total appreciation would thus be
102,531 m
2 × $37.5/m
2 + 165,248 m
2 × $22.5/m
2 + 228,080 m
2 × $15/m
2 = $10,984,193
or roughly eleven million in Table 1.
In the slum, each family occupies an average of 30 m
2, plus 10 m
2 of common areas.  The
slum dwellers are relocated to units occupying 50 m
2, plus 25 m
2 of common areas, or a total of 75
m
2 per family.  Therefore the total area of the new development is 75,000 m
2.  The unit cost of the
land where the slum is relocated is assumed to be only one fifth of the released land, or $30/m
2 for
a total of $2,250,000.  It is assumed that the slum is relocated to undeveloped land, which would
increase its value as a result of the urbanization.  Therefore, and following the same method used for
the slum area, three concentric rings of 100m increase their values in 33.33%, 27.65% and 11.11%,
respectively.   The radius of a circular surface of 75,000 m
2 is 154.5 m.  Therefore, the surface of the
concentric circles are:
 × 254.5
2    75,000 = 128,482 m
2
 × 354.5
2  203,482 = 191,323 m
2.  
 × 454.5
2  394,805 = 254,154 m
2.  
and the resulting increases in land values are:
$10.0/m
2 × 128,482 = $1,284,820
$5.36/m
2 × 203,482 = $1,090,663
$3.33/m
2 × 394,805 = $1,314,700
Total          = $3,690,183
or approximately $3.7 million in Table 1.24 Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects 24
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